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RECENT CASES
RADIO TAXATION

A New Mexico radio station, sought to determine its liability under an
emergency school tax stitute which imposed a two percent privilege tax on the
gross receipts of its business. It is contended that its broadcasting was wholly
interstate even though it included some broadcasting that was primarily for local
audiences and that the tax was a burden on interstate commerce. 1 Held, that the
local advertising originating from the studios was not interstate commerce and
was not therefore subject to the tax, but that transcribed or network programs of
nationally advertised products constituted interstate commerce and was not subject to the tax. Albuquerque Broadcasting Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 184 P.

(2d) 416 (N. M. 1947).
It is well settled that radio broadcasting is subject to federal regulation. In
its present stage of development, there cannot be any physical division of radio
waves between intrastate and interstate communication. 2 Congress, by enacting
legislation, has assumed exclusive control of radio communication.3 As early as
1902, the United States Attorney General4 expressed the opinion "that the transmission of messages by wireless telegraphy was commerce, and subject to the
regulation by Congress." In 1926, in an opinion to the Secretary of Commerce, 5
the Attorney General stated that radio communication was a proper subject for
federal regulation under the commerce clause and that even intrastate transmission of radio waves could fall within the scope of federal power when the
effect of such intrastate transmission was to interfere with interstate commerce.
Subsequent to the Radio Act of 1927,6 many cases appeared before the courts
questioning the validity of the federal legislation. 7 The courts sustained the
legislation on the theory that radio communication was a species of interstate
commerce and therefore subject to regulation by Congress. Early attempts by
states to impose license fees and some forms of taxation on broadcasting were
struck down on the theory then held that all radio broadcasting was interstate
commerce. 8 Although it is settled that even local radio broadcasting so affects
1. U. S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8 (3).
2. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mort. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct.
627, 77 L. Ed. 1166, 89 A. L. R. 406 (1933).
3. 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), as amended, 47 U. S. C. A. sees. 151-155 and 301-329 (Supp. 1947).
4. 24 Ops. Att'y Gen. 100 (1902). See 40 A. L. R. 1514. See also Hoover v. Intercity Radio
Co., 286 Fed. 1003 (App. D. C. 1923).

5. 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926).
6. 44 Stat. 1162, 47 U. S. C. A. See. 81.
7. KFKB Broadcasting Association Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F. (2d) 670
(App. D. C. 1931); White v. Federal Radio Commission, 29 F. (2d) 113, 66 A. L. R.
1363 (N. D. Ill. 1928) ; United States v. Am. Bond & Mort. Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D.
Il1. 1929) ; City of New York v. Federal Radio Commission, 36 F.

(2d)

115

(App.

D. C. 1929) ; Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Commission, 36 F. (2d) 111,
66 A. L. R. 1355, (App. D. C. 1929) ; General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commis8.

sion, 58 App. D. C. 386, 31 F. (2d) 630 (1929).
In Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 F. (2d) 787 (E. D. Ky. 1927), it was held that a city

ordinance which required persons operating a radio station to pay a license tax was
void as a regulation of interstate commerce. The court stated that "radio communication is all interstate ... though they may be intended only for intrastate transmission."
Similarly in Station WBT v. Poulnot, 46 F. (2d) 671 (E. D. S. C. 1931), discussed in
17 Iowa L. Rev. 451, 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1148, 40 Yale L. J. 990, and 17 Va. L. Rev.
694, a state tax on receiving sets was struck down as being a direct tax upon a
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interstate communication as to be subject to federal regulation, it does not necessarily follow that it is all interstate commerce and therefore not subject to any
form of state taxation. The most common type of tax which states impose on
this activity is the general property tax. Property within the state is subject to
normal property taxation even though the property be used in interstate commerce. 9
During the period from 1931-1937, courts struck down nearly all attempts
by states to tax the business of broadcasting itself. In Station WBT, Inc. v.
Poulnot,10 the state was enjoined from enforcing the collection of a tax on radio
receiving sets on the ground that the tax was laid directly upon a necessary
instrument of interstate commerce. A Washington court in KVL, Inc. v. Tax
Commission of Washington1l declared a tax on the gross income of a radio station
invalid as an imposition of a direct burden on interstate commerce because the
radio carrier waves in intrastate commerce could not be segregated from carrier
waves in interstate business. The court reasoned that since the segregation of
intrastate business from interstate business was impossible, the person or firm engaged in the business of radio broadcasting must be.wholly exempt from the tax.
Another early attempt by the State of Washington to collect an occupation tax
measured by the gross receipts of the business of radio broadcasting was declared
invalid, as imposing a burden on interstate commerce, by the United States
Supreme Court in 1936 in the landmark case of Fisher's Blend Station Inc. v.
Tax Commission of Washington.12 In the 1937 case of City of Atlanta v. South-

ern Broadcasting Co.,13 a Georgia court declared an occupation tax on its broadcasting station invalid as a direct burden upon interstate commerce;14 but for
several years after 1937, no new attempts were made by states to tax the business
of broadcasting.
The court in the instant case, in holding that a gross receipts tax was applicable to receipts from the broadcasting of local advertising, demonstrates a
method of imposing such a tax on the business of radio broadcasting. The court
necessary instrument of interstate commerce and imposing a burden thereon, and therefore unconstitutional. In United States v. Am. Bond & Mort. Co., 31 F. (2d) 448 (N. D.
11. 1929), affirmed in 52 F. (2d) 318 (C. C. A. 7th 1931) ; Technical Radio Laboratory
v. Federal Radio Commission, 36 F. (2d) 111, 66 A. L. R. 1355, (App. D. C. 1929) ;
United States v. Gregg, 5 F. Supp. 848 (S. D. Tex. 1934), federal courts upheld federal
power to license and regulate broadcasting stations on the ground that broadcasting
was interstate commerce. Contra: Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University, 178 Ga. 379, 173
S. E. 110 (1934), where the broadcasting originated locally and was solely for local
audiences.
9. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Weaver, 5 F. Supp. 493 (D. C. Neb. 1934) ; Allen v. Pullman Palace Car Co. 191 U. S. 171, 24 Sup. Ct. 39, 48 L. Ed. 1347 (1903) ; New Jersey
Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes, 280 U. S. 338, 50 Sup. Ct. 111, 74 L. Ed. 463 (1930)
See Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 644, 8 Sup. Ct. 1384 (1888).
10. Cited supra note 8.
11. 12 F. Supp. 497 (W. D. Wash. 1935).
12. 297 U. S. 650, 56 Sup. Ct. 608, 80 L. Ed. 956 (1936).
13. 184 Ga. 9, 190 S. E. 594 (1937).

14. However, in Atlanta v. Oglethorpe University, 178 Ga. 379, 173 S.E. 110, 112 (1934),
it was held that a city ordinance which imposed a license fee on a broadcasting station
was valid. The court said that "even if it is true that some of its messages do go
beyond state lines, that does not make it interstate business." But even if the station
did receive messages to be transmitted beyond the state line, the business is almost
altogether intrastate, and its income is derived almost entirely from what might be
called intrastate commerce.
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cited the Fisher's Blend case for the proposition that, since listeners in both
New Mexico and other states heard the broadcasts, the business was both intrastate and interstate.15 Mr. Justice Stone, speaking for the court in the Fisher's
Blend case had suggested that the Washington occupation tax would have
been upheld had it appeared that the taxed income had been allocated to that part
of the business that was entirely intrastate. The instant case demonstrates the
successful application of Mr. Justice Stone's suggestion of allocation to intrastate
business.
In other types of business, many attempts have been made to reach gross
receipts by taxation. In Western Live Stock Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 16 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a New Mexico statute imposing a privilege
tax on the amounts received from the sale of advertising space by persons engaged
in the business of publishing newspapers or magazines. The court stated that the
tax was actually on a local activity since the business of printing and publishing
the magazine advertisements was local, and that it was in no way connected with
the activity of circulation; furthermore, that interstate commerce must pay its
just share of the state tax burden. Since the court saw no possibility of any other
state imposing a similar tax on this activity, the tax was upheld. In the case of
Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen,17 however, the same court struck down a
gross receipts tax because of the possibility of multiple taxation. The court felt
that such taxes could be duplicated in other states, and that since a part of the
business was interstate, the tax was invalid because not apportioned to the intrastate business.18 This same fear of multiple taxation was expressed in Gwin,
White & Prince v. Henneford,19 although the court also placed emphasis on the
fact that the state was attempting to lay a privilege tax measured by gross receipts
derived from activities in commerce which extended beyond the territorial limits
of the taxing state.
The decision in the instant case appears to be on quite firm ground inasmuch
as it relied upon the United States Supreme Court's strong language in the
Western Live Stock case. There, as here, the tax was determined by receipts from advertising. The tax in both cases was sustained for the reasons that
it was capable of being applied only to local business, and that there was no possibility of the same activity being taxed by any other state. Additional support
can be found in the early case of Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,2O
15. This same proposition was advanced in Whitmore v. Bureau of Revenue of State of
New Mexico, 64 F. Supp. 911 (D. C. N. M. 1946) ; affirmed in 329 U. S. 668, 67 Sup.
Ct. 62 (1946) ; in which the same tax statute came before the District Court for the
District of New Mexico. The action was dismissed without prejudice to institution
of actions in state courts, the court stating that the New Mexico state courts had
jurisdiction to hear an action for relief against a collector of taxes and penalties imposed under authority of sec. 76-1404, N. M. Stat. Ann. (1941).
16. 303 U. S. 250, 58 Sup. Ct. 546, 82 L. Ed. 823, 115 A. L. R. 944 (1938).
17. 304 U. S. 307, 58 Sup. Ct. 913, 82 L. Ed. 1365, 117 A. L. R. 429 (1938).
18. For an excellent discussion of the apportionment of gross receipts taxes to intrastate
business and the danger of duplication of such taxes by other states, see Powell, More
Ado About Gross Receipt Taxes, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 501; Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. 1; Dunham, Gross Receipts Taxes on Interstate Transactions, 47 Col. L. Rev. 211.
19. 305 U. S. 434, 59 Sup. Ct. 326, 83 L. Ed. 272 (1939).
20. 127 U. S. 411, 8 Sup. Ct. 1127, 32 L. Ed. 229 (1888).
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which suggested that state taxation could be applied to radio if it were a severable
gross receipts tax. The court said it could sustain a tax on gross receipts from
intrastate commerce and condemn only that part of the tax that reached receipts
from interstate commerce. In Whitmore v. Bureau of Revenue, a case based on
facts like those in the instant case, the United States District Court for New
Mexico held that the business of radio broadcasting was partially intrastate and
partially interstate and that the intrastate business was taxable by the state. The
21
Supreme Court affirmed this decision without opinion.
The New Mexico courts have approached the subject of state taxation of
radio broadcasting from a practical viewpoint, adopting the views Mr. Justice
Stone first advanced in 1938. In accordance with these views, the court would
strike down a tax measured by the gross receipts only if such receipts were derived
from activities which extended beyond the territorial limits of the taxing state, or
if such tax was capable of duplication by other states. However, in the recent
case of Freeman v. Hewit,23 the language of the court indicates the possibility of
returning to the pre-1938 doctrine of "direct" and "indirect" burden as the test
to be applied, and of discarding what seems to be the more practical tests; apportionment to intrastate commerce and the danger of multiple taxation. A return
of the court to the "direct-indirect" test could result in preventing other state
legislatures from seeking additional revenue by taxation even upon that radio
broadcasting which is intrastate. However, the gross receipts tax on the privilege
24
of intrastate broadcasting is now in effect in New Mexico and the high court in
that state has supported the legislature's action on the subject.
WILLIAM C. LAGOS

WARNING DEVICES AT CROSSINGS

In an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff stopped in reliance upon a
wigwag provided by the defendant railroad company. After the wigwag had
stopped oscillating and an electric car had passed, the plaintiff drove his car
across the tracks. The plaintiff looked to the south upon reaching the first of
four sets of tracks but did not see the train approaching from the north until
about five feet from the point of collision. The defendant was clearly negligent
in operating its electric car but it is contended that the plaintiff was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law. Having been nonsuited in the court below, the
plaintiff appeals. Held, that the driver's contributory negligence was a question
for the jury and the judgment was reversed. Spendlove v. Pacific Electric Ry.
Co., 184 P. (2d) 873 (Cal. 1947).
"The decisions are not in accord as to the extent which a traveler may rely
on the indication of safety which the silence of a signaling device at a crossing
21. Cited supra note 15.

22. Cited supra note 8.
23. 329 U. S. 249, 67 Sup. Ct. 274 (1946).

24. For a similar statute see Ariz. Code Ann. Sec. 73-1301 par. 2 subsec. (c) (8) (1939).

